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Dear Clerk of the Court: 
Pursuant to Rule 24(j) of the Rules of the Supreme Court, 
respondent IHC Hospitals, Inc. hereby advises the Court of a 
decision which has recently come to counsels1 attention. 
The argument beginning on page is 3 0 of this respondent's 
brief, !fB. Applicability of the Statute of Limitations to a 
Minor is Constitutional11, should be supplemented with the 
following citation: 
Douglas v. Hugh A. Stallings, M.D., Inc., 870 
F.2d 1242 (7th Cir. 1989) (limits imposed on 
a brain damaged minor by the malpractice 
statute of limitations are rationally related 
to the goals of preventing stale claims and 
controlling the cost of medical care; the 
state need not provide a tolling provision 
for minority and mental incompetents or a 
discovery rule in order to comply with due 
process guarantees). 
November 15, 1989 
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A copy of this letter is being sent to all counsel. 
Very truly yours, 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & POELMAN 
David B. Erickson 
DBE/kp 
cc: Carman E. Kipp 
Heinz J. Mahler 
Paul S. Felt 
Dale F. Gardiner 
Robert J. DeBry 
Appellants Roger Atkinson and Polly Atkinson for 
themselves and as guardians ad litem for Chad Atkinson respect-
fully submit appellant's reply brief. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
POINT I - EACH OF THE POINTS RAISED IN MORGAN'S BRIEF ARE 
~ FACTUAL ISSUES IN DISPUTE 
Each of the points raised in Morgan's brief are 
factual issues, to be determine by a jury. Those issues 
include: 
1) W h e t h -i v ' h ^ i e w a s an ! ' 'irney ' •-\ i~>:>, \. 
'. » *<<• . • • - • . w 
2) -".\>r-.:- ".• i aan was neqliaent? and 
3) whet h-
 ; Morgan < aused Atkinson;- damages. 
Th< :><-> i :-si. 
agri.n.-L .'Uji^ iii. Iiu.'t .... ,i... 
POINT II - ATKINSONS' DECISION TO SUE THE OTHER DEFENDANTS 
FOR FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION DOES 
NOT BAR THE ATKINSONS FROM SUING MORGAN FOR 
NEGLIGENCE 
"• • -•*.• i.- ;•• - • < • : • : u n u ii' it 
. • • . »-j •) - . - , - -
\''..-.\t At i- insons ri i H O ha"''-- "l-*].i'- ; negligence 
against Morgan. Pursuing one claim does not bar another claim. 
POINT III - APPARENTLY MORGAN CONCEDES THAT HE IS LIABLE TO 
THE ATKINSONS UNDER THE THEORIES OF IMPLIED 
CONTRACT, LIMITED ATTORNEY/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, 
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND ACTING AS A VOLUNTEER 
Morgan's brief does not contest Atkinsons' theories 
1 
of implied contract; limited attorney/client relationship; 
third party liability; and volunteer. Apparently he concedes 
liability under these theories. 
POINT IV - ATKINSONS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY ACCEPTING 
THE INADEQUATE SETTLEMENT BENEFITS 
The victim of fraud or negligent misrepresentation 
may accept the benefits of the settlement contract and sue to 
recover damages. Accepting the minimal benefits does not 
prevent the Atkinsons from suing for compensatory damages. 
POINT V - WHETHER IHC, WETZEL, AND/OR OLSEN MISREPRESENTED 
CHAD ATKINSON' 
SETTLEMENT IS 
S 
A 
CONDITION 
CONTESTED 
OR THE 
FACT 
VALUE 
ISSUE 
OF 
FOR 
THE 
THE 
JURY TO DECIDE 
Whether IHC, Wetzel and Olsen misrepresented the 
facts to the Atkinsons is a question of fact for the jury to 
determine. IHC's argument that it did not misrepresent 
anything only raises the issue of fact. It does not justify a 
summary judgment. 
POINT VI - THE RELEASE INDUCED BY FRAUD DOES NOT JUSTIFY A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
The release does not justify a summary judgment 
against the Atkinsons because: 
1) There is a factual issue as to whether Wetzel 
and Olsen were independent contractors or agents 
2 
• . • for IHC. 
I ' " 
release was obtained by fraud. 
3) •- i.irijuag^ *r r hi .eluaso itseii ayes not i.-'-ir 
POINT VII -
 C Q L L A T E R A L E S T O p p E L D Q E S N Q T B A R T H E A T K I N S 0 N S ^ 
CLAIM AGAINST IHC, WETZEL AND OLSEN 
Co J lateral estoppel does i: lot bar the Atk I i isoi is • e j a i i n 
because: 
f
 •< -1 :i i igs ai id t h e s e p r o c e e d i i igs 
nr*:- * ; 1 : I i 'i i. * - > I t. LSoutlb; 
I 'i*-} A O ° .\< I U ^ ' V ; % . ' i'ja^-i'^n: a n d 
in i • i ' 
probate pro^^^nings. 
POINT VIII - WHETHER THE ATKINSONS COMMENCED THIS ACTION 
WITHIN THREE YEARS AFTER DISCOVERING THE TRUE 
CONDITION OF CHAD IS FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE 
11 :i s u p t o a j i I i: y t o d e t e rm i i ie wh e n t h e At k i i I s c i I s 
learned o r shouId h a v e 1earned of 11 i e fraud I nf1i c t ed u p o n 
11 lert i Tl: te case shouId be remanded for trial to 1 et 11 le j i Ii: y 
dec Ide t ha 1: I. s s ue . 
3 
POINT IX - THE ATKINSONS BROUGHT THEIR CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN, §78-12-25 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 provides a four year period 
within which to bring a negligence action. The Atkinsons' 
claims for negligent misrepresentation were brought within the 
four year period. 
POINT X - JUST BECAUSE THE PROBATE COURT APPROVED AN 
INADEQUATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT MEAN 
THAT THE ATKINSONS CANNOT SUE FOR FRAUD OR 
NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION 
The fact that the probate court summarily approved 
the inadequate settlement does not mean the settlement cannot 
be re-opened when the settlement was obtained by fraud or 
misrepresentation. Probate proceedings can and are re-opened 
when agreements are obtained by fraud or misrepresentation. 
POINT XI - EVERY ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS COLORED BY THE FACT 
THAT JUDGE FISHLER FAILED TO ANALYZE THE MERITS 
OF THE SETTLEMENT 
The probate court failed to analyze the merits of the 
inadequate settlement. Therefore, the court approval required 
by Utah Code Ann. §75-5-409 is missing or defective. 
POINT XII - THE UNDERLYING COURT APPROVAL WAS AKIN TO A 
FAIRY TALE 
The court failed to explain the then present value of 
the settlement. The proceedings were similar to a fairy tale. 
4 
POINT XIII MOST ISSUES IN THIS CASE WOULD BE PREMATURE IF 
THIS COURT ELECTS TO REMAND FOR A NEW HEARING 
TO CORRECT DEFECTS IN THE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT 
HEARING 
proceedings. The <~*< n:t sh- u. : -itn*-' ^ -uj.ii.r- * "\* robate court 
to correct th« defects, or JLH ine alternative, set L;*e case ioi 
t r i a 1, 
IV. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I - . :* 1'K-JL,ULT1^N 
Roger and Pol'y Atkinson ^^^ ^ ^ n T Tr*l-ermount ^ * r 
Healt.li Car-- fi< st ito - Sr<M ! Wetzel Services, Fn". 
• / * • • - / . • • ) , 
Wet.z^I *s employee, tor Iran ? -?< . negligen' ' , srepresentation. 
S p e C i i l C a i ' ' :" * ' •" - : • i o c-. , ; p »..j.. -
misrepresent*- . 
Atkinson .*• • < ralue '" s^tt i *}ni*-nt agreement. rJ'he 
misrepresents* : n "PJSO<* " tkxiisuns *• into an 
i nij*:equa:,' : . .:ii .. .*-•• . *'.;* 'it agreement • .nsons are* 
also T.inq Stepher • V> " ;-• ivi ii • , -w : : : \ *• -j r , ^caliey 
1 • iTw^i . ;ui t. i.,iiii i IA^ .. iiM* *.*- r ol :^ +" Morion 
vvdii not th<- Atkinsons" attorney and granted summary judgmei it ii i 
5 
favor of Morgan. The lower court also ruled that the doctrine 
of collateral estoppelf the settlement agreement and/or the 
statute of limitations barred the Atkinsons' claims. (R. 267-
272, 52-58, 590-5*93, 655-) 
Each of those issues was addressed in the Atkinsons' 
"Brief of Appellant". 
The respondents raise several additional issues, most 
of which were not a basis for the lower court's ruling. 
Respondent's arguments involve contested questions of fact, 
showing that summary judgment should not have been granted. In 
addition, because the summary probate court proceeding was 
incomplete and flawed, the case should be remanded to (1) re-
open the probate court proceedings or (2) to allow the 
Atkinsons a trial on their amended complaint. Atkinsons' reply 
brief addresses the foregoing issues. 
POINT II - EACH OF THE POINTS RAISED IN MORGAN'S BRIEF ARE 
FACTUAL ISSUES IN DISPUTE 
The Atkinsons sued Stephen Morgan and Morgan, Scalley 
& Reading (his firm) for negligence and malpractice. Morgan's 
Brief begins by alleging there is "no legal basis" for a claim 
of malpractice against Morgan and his firm. Morgan's brief 
cites no legal authority for the notion that Atkinsons' claims 
are not based on sound legal theories. When he alleges there 
6 
is i lux > 1 ega ] basis, Morgan simply argues: 
1) " • : ldLionship. 
3) Morg-u .;, : • ! rause the AtKinsons' damages. 
4) i . 
Each of the foregoi r lg arguments - i • T question . i 
law precluding the Atkinsons' clai ' * - . •f3<~i-!^- Rather, 
e a c 1 i i s a 1 101 ] y c o i :i I: e s t e d i s s i i e o I : I • 
A. Whether There is an Attorney/Client Relationship is a 
Question of Fact for the Fact Finder 
wht-t.hw Morgan wa> tN> Atkinsons r attorney i s a 
decision t - : - ma J- : \ i ' * u - . De Vaux v. American Home 
A o o L* I <-i fiv^ 'J
 f • O ) ) } 
*• - M o r g a n c a n t>t r *'ii:n;u.. * s - .; : ' e h a s ^ o n e s o , 
\\>,^t <,<- v^- -* + * n*- * f'n'ncnn; - M r n n v .^'^  ^ assert^jn ^ 
Pages - -in ' *; . :> ot * •• vtKii.R'Mis' opnni. "i I-i'^f 
sets iortii iacts showing Luau Morgan was their atLorribj . ±o 
summarize: 
I The ' .V. Lrisons .-JSV•-•'•: TvotzeI to i- : 
a t t o m e " ?••-ra-ir vas recommended * L:-
Atkinsons : •.. ^ u c , ^ c a u s e Wei ze. -•*.- -J ; 
Morgan won. I - .o ••are o: t,r;*':• Atkinsons. 
2) Morgan introduced himself to the Atkinsons, as 
their lawyer, and said he would help them. 
3) The Atkinsons asked for legal advice and 
assistance and he provided it to them. 
4) Morgan entered his appearance in court as 
representing "them". 
5) The Atkinsons believed Morgan was their 
attorney. 
B. Whether Morgan was Negligent is a Contested Fact Issue 
In Utah, summary judgments are granted in negligence 
cases only with great caution. The issue of negligence is a 
question of fact for the fact finder. Apache Tank Lines, Inc. 
v. Cheney 706 P.2d 614, 615 (Utah 1985); FMA Acceptance Co. v. 
Leatherby Insurance Co., 594 P.3d 1332 (Utah 1979)1. 
Similarly, negligence in a legal malpractice case is 
an issue of fact. See, Wellman .v Jellison, 593 F.2d 876 (9th 
Cir. 1979). 
The Utah courts have never ruled that it takes expert 
testimony to establish negligence in a malpractice case. And 
even if expert testimony was required, the expert testimony was 
supplied by an affidavit of Richard Hendrickson and by Judge 
1 Once an attorney/client relationship is established, the 
elements for legal malpractice are the same as for negligence. 
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There is plenty of evidence from which a jury could 
determine that Morgan's negligence caused damages to the 
Atkinsons, as follows: 
1. The agreement with IHC was not finished before 
Morgan was hired. 
I told them that they would have to hire an 
attorney to finalized this with the court. 
Scott Wetzel deposition p. 42. 
Q. Before you went to the fifth meeting, had you 
and Polly decided to accept Scott Wetzel's 
proposal. 
A. I don't think so in full, that's why we went to 
see the lawyer. 
Q. Which lawyer. 
A. Stephen Morgan. 
(R. 644, p.90.) 
2. Whether Morgan was hired in a limited capacity 
is in dispute. 
Roger Atkinson (father) testified that he went to 
defendant for overall advice: 
Q. Before you went to the fifth meeting, had you 
and Polly decided to accept Scott Wetzel's 
proposal. 
A. I don't think so in full, that's why we went to 
see the lawyer [defendant Morgan]. 
Q. Are you saying you and Polly decided to accept 
the offer before you consulted with Steve 
Morgan? 
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A. I think we decided to accept it and then he sent 
us over there to look it over with him, with 
Steve Morgan. 
644, p 91.) 
Q. What happened next? 
A. He [Scott Olsen] said he would line up a lawyer 
for us for legal counsel. 
92. ) 
Q. Tell us what was said and by whom in that 
meeting [the first meeting] with Mr. Morgan. 
We were introduced to him as Steve Morgan. He 
said he was our lawyer to represent us ... 
94.) 
Q. Did you ask any questions about it [the 
settlement documents]? 
A. No I figured he was giving us his opinion, 
that's why they sent us to him? 
95.) 
Q. You didn't ever ask him if this is a good deal 
or a bad deal, isn't that true. . . 
A. I think I did. 
118. ) 
Q. Do you deny you had information that he was 
counsel for Intermountain Health Care at the 
time this court hearing was held? 
A. Yes sir. It was my belief he was a lawyer for 
us. 
125. ) 
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The testimony of Polly Atkinson (mother) was of 
similar import. 
Q. [T]ell me again what Steve Morgan said to you in 
that meeting in his office before you went to 
court, . . 
A. He told us he was there to represent us and he 
was there to help us and go over the contracts 
and have us sign them. . . . 
(R. 647, p. 99.) 
3. Morgan's advise caused the Atkinsons to accept a 
low settlement offer. 
All the Atkinsons must show and they have shown, was 
that, but for Morgan's negligence, their loss would not have 
occurred or that the amount would have been less. e.g. 
Molever v. Roush, 732 P.2d 1105 (Ariz. App. 1986). Because 
Morgan was negligent in performing and failing to perform 
duties to the Atkinsons, the inquiry is, assuming the attorney 
had competently performed, would the Atkinsons have 
benefited. e.g. Ross v. Adelman, 725 S.W.2d 896 (Mo. App. 
1987) . 
But for Morgan's incorrect advice and substandard 
conduct, the Atkinsons would not have settled their claim for 
substantially less than it's worth. (R. 334.) 
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D. Whether the Atkinsons Sustained Damages is Also an Issue 
of Fact for the Jury to Determine> 
The determination of the extent of the damages 
sustained in a legal malpractice case is a question of fact. 
Curran v. Stradley, Ronon, Stevens & Young, 521 A.2d 451 (Pa. 
1987); Rogers v. Robsonf Masters, Ryan, Brummond & Belom, 392 
N.E.2d 1365 (Ill.App. 1979). 
Further, the Atkinsons' damages are not speculative. 
The facts of the underlying case are: 
a) Chad Atkinson suffered extensive and permanent 
brain damage. He is a vegetable. (R. 645 p. 7, 
13; R. 647 p. 105.) 
b) The injury was caused by the hospital nurse in 
shutting off the monitor alarm and subsequently 
failing to check on the condition of Chad 
Atkinson. Id. 
c) The Atkinsons accepted a settlement with present 
day value of $118,000 plus medical bills. (R. 
653 p.78.) 
A jury could well conclude that Morgan's errors and omissions 
caused the Atkinsons extensive damages measured by the value of 
their claim, less the value of the settlement. Burke v. 
Roberson, 417 N.W.2d 209, 212 (Iowa 1987); Sanders v. 
Townsend, 509 N.E.2d 860 (Ind. App. 1987). 
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In summary, each of the arguments raised in Morgan's 
brief are contested fact issues for a jury to determine. 
POINT III - ATKINSON'S DECISION TO SUE THE OTHER DEFENDANTS 
FOR FRAUD AND NEGLIGENT MISREPRESENTATION DOES 
NOT BAR THE ATKINSONS FROM SUING MORGAN FOR 
NEGLIGENCE 
Without any authority whatsoever, Morgan argues that 
because the Atkinsons sued the other defendants for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation, the Atkinsons cannot sue Morgan. 
That is absolute nonsense. 
The only authority cited by Morgan states the 
obvious. You can only sue for fraud those who are parties to 
the fraud. However, the Atkinsons did not sue Morgan for 
fraud. They sued him for negligence. 
Atkinsons' claims against each defendant are separate 
as are the facts sustaining each claim. Further, a settlement 
with a third party does not prevent the client from suing his 
attorney for breaching his duty to the client. Rodriguez v. 
Horton, 622 P.2d 261 (N.W. 1980); Talbot v. Schneider, 475 P.2d 
520 (Ariz. 1970). 
POINT IV - APPARENTLY MORGAN CONCEDES THAT HE IS LIABLE TO 
THE ATKINSONS UNDER THE THEORIES OF IMPLIED 
CONTRACT, LIMITED ATTORNEY/CLIENT RELATIONSHIP, 
THIRD PARTY LIABILITY AND ACTING AS A VOLUNTEER 
In Atkinsons' opening brief, they set forth the 
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factual and legal basis for holding Morgan liable to the 
Atkinsons under theories of: 
1) Implied contract; 
2) Limited attorney/client relationship; 
3) Third party liability; 
4) Acting as a volunteer. 
Appellant's Brief p. 13-23. 
Neither the factual nor legal basis for each theory 
is contested by Morgan. He apparently concedes, the alternate 
theories for imposing liability. 
POINT V - ATKINSONS' CLAIMS ARE NOT BARRED BY ACCEPTING 
THE INADEQUATE SETTLEMENT BENEFITS 
The Atkinsons sued IHC, Wetzel Olsen for fraud and 
negligent misrepresentation. In Utah, a plaintiff in an action 
for fraud has the option to elect to rescind the transaction or 
to accept the benefits of the transaction and sue to recover 
damages. Duqan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980). 
The choice of the remedy belongs to the Atkinsons, the victim 
of the fraud and misrepresentation. Mecham v. Benson, 590 P.2d 
304 (Utah 1979) . 
Consistent with the forgoing authority, the Atkinsons 
accepted the minimal benefits and sued for damages. Contrary 
to the erroneous assertions on pages 23-27 of IHC's brief, one 
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who has been defrauded may affirm the benefits of the contract 
without forfeiting his right to maintain an action to recover 
damages resulting from the deceit. Pace v. Parrish, 122 U.2d 
141, 247 P.2d 273 (1952) . 
Simply put, the Atkinsons do not have to return the 
settlement benefits to sue IHC, Wetzel, Olsen and Morgan for 
fraud, negligent misrepresentation and negligence. They may 
keep the benefits and sue for damages. See generally, Coke v. 
Tumby, 57 U.2d 53, 192 P.2d 624 (1920); Reliable Furniture Co. 
v. Fidelity & Guaranty Insurance Underwriters, Inc., 16 U.2d 
211, 398 P.2d 685, (1965); Simonson v. Travis, 728 P.2d 999 
(Utah 1986). 
POINT VI - WHETHER IHC, WETZEL, AND/OR OLSEN MISREPRESENTED 
CHAD ATKINSON'S CONDITION OR THE VALUE OF THE 
SETTLEMENT IS A CONTESTED FACT ISSUE FOR THE 
JURY TO DECIDE 
IHC begins the argument section of its brief in 
essentially the same way Morgan began his. i.e., no one did 
anything wrong. IHC says it did not misrepresent anything. 
However, whether IHC, Wetzel or Olsen misrepresented Chad's 
condition or the value of the settlement is a question for the 
jury to decide. Condas v. Adams, 388 P.2d 803, (Utah 1969); as 
is the question of whether the Atkinsons relied on the 
misrepresentation of IHC, Wetzel and Olsen. Berkeley Bank for 
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Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 798 (Utah 1980). 
There is abundant evidence that IHC, Wetzel and 
Olsen materially misrepresented the facts to the Atkinsons. 
See pages 5, 7, 32, 33, 34, 35, and 36 of Atkinsons' opening 
brief• 
Further, each of the subpoints raised in IHC's 
initial argument is factually contested by the Atkinsons. For 
example, the defendants allege that Roger and Polly knew the 
extent of Chad's injuries and anticipated his future problems. 
Such was not the case. 
A. He [Matlak] didn't tell me. . .what brain 
damage really means. I knew it means "damage" 
but not that kind of damage. 
Q. You understand that this brain damage was 
permanent? 
A. No, I did not know. He didn't tell me it was 
permanent. They never mentioned anything like 
that. 
Q. At what point in time did you realize that Chad 
was not going to be a normal child? 
A. When he was a little over three. 
(R. 647 p.80.) 
In addition, whether the Atkinsons declined to have 
their child evaluated in Arizona does not determine whether 
misrepresentations were made and the Atkinsons relied on them. 
The reason the Atkinsons declined the evaluations was because: 
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1) They were told their child was going to be okay; 
2) Olsen told the Atkinsons they were getting free 
money and the Atkinsons did not want to lose it. 
(R. 644 p. 53-54.) 
In summary, there is abundant evidence that IHC, 
Wetzel and Olsen misrepresented facts to the Atkinsons, IHC's 
protestations to the contrary. It is an issue for the jury to 
decide. The case should be reversed and remanded for trial. 
POINT VII - THE RELEASE INDUCED BY FRAUD DOES NOT JUSTIFY A 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
IHC claims the Atkinsons' claims are barred by the 
plain language of the release induced by fraud. Wetzel and 
Olsen claim that they are agents of IHC and agree with IHC that 
the plain language of the release bars all claims. 
Morgan, Wetzel and Olsen also say that because the 
Atkinsons knew Chad had suffered some type of brain damage, 
the release was not obtained by fraud. However, as set forth 
in Point VI of this brief, whether IHC, Wetzel and Olsen 
misrepresented Chad's condition and whether the Atkinsons 
relied on the misrepresentation are questions of fact. There 
is substantial evidence showing that the Atkinsons did not 
understand the extent of Chad's injury at the time they signed 
the release. 
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Q. At the time you signed the settlement agreement 
in July of 1983, what was your understanding of 
Chad's condition? 
A. He was a baby. It looked like he was 
progressing great. He was doing fine. He was 
just a baby. 
Q. Did anyone tell you your son would be 
permanently brain damaged? 
A. They gave it to me like he had a minor handicap, 
if anything, and the way they made it look, you 
know, that with a little therapy or so forth. . 
.that he would be fine. 
(R. 644 p. 109.) 
Further, whether Scott Wetzel Services, Inc. and 
Wetzel's employee, Olsen, were agents of IHC is a question of 
fact for the jury to decide. e.g. Northern v. McGraw Edison, 
Co., 542 F.2d 1336 (8th Cir. 1976). 
The IHC/Wetzel Services contract (copy attached in 
the addendum) and the testimony cited in page 38 of 
appellant's opening brief, raises the factual issue of whether 
Wetzel and Olsen were agents or independent contractors. It is 
up to the jury to resolve the issue. 
Even if Wetzel and Olsen were agents of IHC (and they 
were not), the language of the release itself does not bar the 
Atkinsons' claims. The release only bars claims arising out of 
Chad's accident. It does not bar claim for fraud. 
Finally, even if the language of the release itself 
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barred Atkinsons' claims, it still would not bar the Atkinsons 
from suing IHC, Wetzel and Olsen. A release induced by fraud 
may be avoided. It does not bar anything. Kelly v. Salt Lake 
Transport Co., 116 P.2d 383 (Utah 1941). 
POINT VIII - COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL DOES NOT BAR THE ATKINSONS' 
CLAIMS AGAINST IHC, WETZEL AND OLSEN 
Three of the four elements required to apply 
collateral estoppel are missing. 
The issues presented in the probate court are not the 
issues being litigated in this case. In the probate court, the 
judge did not rule on any claims for misrepresentation. He did 
not know the release was obtained by misrepresentation. He did 
not evaluate any claims against Wetzel and Olsen because they 
were not a party to the probate proceedings. There was no 
litigation. In fact, the probate judge did not evaluate the 
claim against IHC. 
Q. [Y]ou didn't evaluate the underlying claim 
against IHC did you? 
A. No I didn't? 
(Deposition of Philip R. Fishier taken March 30, 1988.) 
Further, there was no final judgment on the merits. 
Not just any court order or judgment is sufficient to trigger 
collateral estoppel. There must be a judgment on the merits. 
see, In Re West Jordan 7 U.2d 391, 326 P.2d 155 (1958). While 
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se, as in this case, plaintiffs made a claim against 
el Services that statements made by a Scott Wetzel repre-
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In the case of defendants Scott Wetzel Company and 
The Home Group, we hold that, even if the Chapmans1 
claims are take as true, no fiduciary relationship 
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However, our cases dealing with fraudulent concealment 
indicate that neither material omissions nor fraudulent 
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Atkinson, Therefore, appellants have no cause of action against 
Scott Wetzel Services and Scott Olsen and the summary judgment 
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cc: Robert J. DeBry 
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settlement agreements may be final for contractual purposes (as 
set forth in Wetzel and Olsen's brief), they are not the basis 
for a final judgment on the merits. Appellant's brief p. 43. 
POINT IX - WHETHER THE ATKINSONS COMMENCED THIS ACTION 
WITHIN THREE YEARS AFTER DISCOVERING THE TRUE 
CONDITION OF CHAD IS FOR THE JURY TO DECIDE 
The Atkinsons, in their opening brief, cite testimony 
that they learned Chad's true condition after March of 1986. 
Appellant's brief p. 53, 54. 
IHCf Wetzel and Olsen all say that the Atkinsons knew 
of Chad's condition at the July 22, 1983 probate hearings. 
This action was filed on July 21, 1987. (R. 1-15.) 
Because there is conflicting evidence suggesting when 
the Atkinsons learned of the fraud and misrepresentation, it is 
up to the jury to determine when the fraud was discovered or 
when it should have been discovered. e.g. Sherbeck v. Lyman's 
Estate, 552 P.2d 1076 (Wash.App. 1976); see, Christiansen v. 
Rees, 436 P.2d 435 (Utah 1961). (Whether the patient commenced 
the action within 4 years after he knew or should have known of 
the surgical needle left in his body, was an issue to be 
resolved by the trial of fact.) 
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POINT X - THE ATKINSONS BROUGHT THEIR CLAIMS FOR NEGLIGENT 
MISREPRESENTATION WITHIN THE TIME ALLOWED BY 
UTAH CODE ANN, §78-12-25 
Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25 provides a four year statute 
of limitation within which to bring a lawsuit. The four year 
statute covers actions for negligence and breach of fiduciary 
duty actions. Hansen v. Petrof Tracking Co./ 527 P. 2d 116 
(Utah 1974); Kamas Sec. Co. v. Taylor, 119 U.2d 241, 226 P.2d 
111 (1950). Even if a fact finder determines that the 
Atkinsons should have learned of Chad's true condition by July 
22, 1983, the date of the probate proceedings, the Atkinsons 
brought their claims for negligent misrepresentation within the 
four year period allowed by Utah Code Ann. §78-12-25. 
POINT XI - JUST BECAUSE THE PROBATE COURT APPROVED AN 
INADEQUATE SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT DOES NOT MEAN 
THAT THE ATKINSONS CANNOT SUE FOR FRAUD AND 
MISREPRESENTATION 
In an unscheduled and minimal probate court 
proceeding, the probate court summarily approved the 
IHC/Atkinson settlement agreement. The probate court did not 
evaluate the Atkinsons' underlying malpractice claim. (Fishier 
deposition p. 51.) 
As set forth previously in this brief, the Atkinsons 
may return the benefits of the settlement agreement and sue for 
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fraud. They have that remedy whether or not the court approved 
the settlement. Agreements approved by the probate court can 
be re-opened for fraud or misrepresentation. Matter of Estate 
of Chasel, 725 P.2d 1345 (Utah 1986). 
POINT XII - EVERY ISSUE IN THIS CASE IS COLORED BY THE FACT 
THAT JUDGE FISHLER FAILED TO ANALYZE THE MERITS 
OF THE SETTLEMENT 
All of the Defendants in this case (IHC Hospitals, 
Scott Wetzel Services, Stephen Morgan, etc.) rely on Judge 
Fishier's approval of the settlement agreement. Each defendant 
argues that a court approved settlement insulates them from 
this lawsuit. 
However, Judge Fishier admitted that he made no 
independent evaluation of the settlement (Fishier deposition at 
p. 51:21-23). Therefore, the court approved settlement was 
clearly defective.* 
The court may. . .ratify any [settlement] 
contract. . .if the court determines that 
the transaction is in the best interests of 
the protected person. (Emphasis added.) 
Utah Code Ann. §75-5-409(2) (1953). 
In other words, the core issue is whether a defective 
court approved settlement will protect the defendants from a 
2 See generally authorities collected at Point III B and 
Point IV of Brief of Appellant. 
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later lawsuit. None of the defendants' briefs comment on that 
crucial issue. 
If the court approval was defective below, we simply 
have an unfinished settlement agreement. Specifically, the 
guardian ad litem (Roger and Polly Atkinson) has agreed. The 
defendants (IHC Hospitals, Scott Wetzel Services, Stephen 
Morgan) have all agreed. However, the necessary court approval 
is missing (or defective.) See Utah Code Ann. §75-5-409(2). 
Compare, 43 C.J.S., Infants §220 (1955). 
It is the right and duty of the court, even 
though it has appointed a representative 
for the infant, to protect the rights and 
interests of the infant party to litigation 
on its own motion. The rule applies, 
.whether or not the proper relief is asked 
in the pleading. 
The court is bound to notice substantial 
irregularities even though objections are 
not properly presented on the infant's 
behalf.3 
POINT XIII - THE UNDERLYING COURT APPROVAL WAS AKIN TO A 
FAIRY TALE 
There is a famous fairy take called The Emperor's New 
J
 Morgan vigorously argues that he had no attorney/client 
relationship with Atkinsons. (Morgan's Brief at Point I A.) 
If that were true, the court should have a higher duty to 
protect an infant child, where there is no attorney, and where 
neither parent has graduated from high school. (Nevertheless, 
the Atkinsons continue to contend that Morgan had an attorney/ 
client relationship.) 
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Clothes. In that story, the Emperor bought some magical cloth. 
The emperor had a suit made from the magical cloth. Then the 
Emperor paraded through town in his magical new suit. 
However, everyone in town laughed because the emperor 
was really in the nude. The emperor was the last to know of 
the hoax. 
Similarly, Roger and Polly Atkinson were subjects of 
a cruel hoax. Their child would be hopelessly and horribly 
incapacitated for life. (In layman's terms the child was a 
vegetable.) 
Neither Roger nor Polly had ever graduated from high 
school. Roger and Polly were put on parade in a courtroom. 
They were naked because everyone in the courtroom knew 
something that Roger and Polly did not know. The so-called 
structured settlement of $1,280,0004 or even $900,0005 was a 
"gimmick". The true value of the settlement was $118,000 
(R.653 at p. 78). 
That is a "gimmick" often used by insurance companies 
for this very purpose -- to make a settlement sound much better 
than it really is. (R. 235-238.) Judge Fishier knew the 
4
 See Brief of Appellant, at p. 18. 
5
 See Transcript of July 22, 1983 Hearing (Addendum to 
Scott Wetzel's Brief). 
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"gimmick". Stephen Morgan knew the "gimmick". Scott Wetzel 
Services knew the "gimmick". In short, everyone knew the 
"gimmick" but Roger and Polly. 
This court should holdf as a matter of law, that Utah 
Code Ann. §75-5-409(2)6 requires the court, at a minimum, to 
explain the concept of "present value" to unsophisticated 
guardians. 
POINT XIV - MOST ISSUES IN THIS CASE WOULD BE PREMATURE IF 
THIS COURT ELECTS TO REMAND FOR A NEW HEARING 
TO CORRECT DEFECTS IN THE ORIGINAL SETTLEMENT 
HEARING 
There are different approaches to this case. One 
approach is simply to rule that Judge Fishier's approval of the 
settlement was defective, and to remand to cure that defect.7 
If the cases is remanded for that purpose, most of 
the other issues would be premature. (Not moot.) 
Without waiving the other issues urged on appeal, 
Atkinsons would not object to this alternative so long as the 
renewed hearing would include the following elements: 
" The court. . .may ratify any contract. . .if the court 
determines that the transaction is in the best interests of the 
insured person. . . 
7
 This would be slightly different from a motion to vacate 
the settlement, but the result would be similar. See Brief of 
Appellant at Point IV. 
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a) The Atkinsons would be entitled to counsel of 
their choice, and the record should clearly 
indicate who is representing them. 
b) The trial court judge should actively act to 
protect the interests of Chad Atkinson. 
c) The Atkinsons should be able to renounce their 
prior consent upon any good faith showing that 
they did not understand the concept of "present 
value". 
d) Payments made by IHC pursuant to the unfinished 
settlement would be at IHC's own risk — that is 
the Atkinsons would never have to repay such 
payments; except that any payments made pursuant 
to the unfinished settlement would be a set-off 
against any final judgment. 
e) The statute of limitations would be tolled. 
V. 
CONCLUSION 
None of the reasons set forth by the trial court 
justifies the summary judgments. The remaining issues are all 
issues of fact requiring a trial. For these reasons, this 
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court should reverse the judgments of the lower court and 
remand the case for trial on the Atkinsons' amended complaint. 
DATED this day of Cc/aL. , 1989. 
ROBERT J. DEBRY & ASSOCIATES 
Attorney ftpr Appellants 
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ADDENDUM 
A G R E E M E N T 
AGREEMENT, made and entered into this /p— day of 
'Tfhu'e^.U* 19 fig>, by and between Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 
a Utan corporation (hereinafter referred to as f!IHC!l) with its 
principal place of business at 36 South State Street, Floor 22, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, and Scott Wetzel Services, Inc., a 
Washington corporation (hereinafter referred to as flSWSM) with 
its principal place of business at 500 Pacific Avenue, Bremerton, 
Washington 98310: 
W I T N E S S E T H 
WHEREAS, IHC maintains a self-insured plan to cover its 
general and professional liability (malpractice) and workers1 
compensation exposures; and SWS has agreed to perform certain 
services in connection therewith, as herein set forth: 
NOW, THEREFORE, it is agreed as follows: 
1. This Agreement shall become effective January 1, 1981, and 
shall remain in full force and effect indefinitely until 
terminated by either party giving not less than sixty (60) 
days written advance notice of such termination to the other 
party. 
2. During the period or periods of this Agreement, SWS shall 
represent and act for IHC in matters pertaining to the gen-
eral, professional, and workers' compensation liabilities 
of IHC for claims based on events which occur during the 
term or terms of this Agreement. During the term hereof, 
SWS shall devote its best efforts in the conduct of its 
duties hereunder. Such duties shall be the following: 
(a) Receive notice of and create files on each claim 
reported and maintain these files for IHC. 
(b) Investigate all claims as required to determine their 
validity and compensability to negotiate and close 
settlements wherever possible. 
(c) Determine proper benefits and related expenses due on 
compensable cases. 
(d) Make timely payment of benefits due and other claim 
expenses, in accord with payment procedures as estab-
lished from funds provided by IHC. IHC will be wholly 
responsible for providing such funds as may be required 
for these payments. 
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(e) Prepare documentation and defense of cases considered 
non-compensable, represent IHC at State and Federal 
agencies, and assist selected legal counsel in prepar-
ation of cases for hearings, appeals, and/or trial. 
(f) Maintain and provide IHC pertinent data on all claim 
and expense payments. 
(g) Provide monthly and/or quarterly computerized loss re-
ports in a tailored format, as mutually agreed at incep-
tion of the program, showing descriptive data, details 
of each month's payments, total payments, reserves and 
total experience for each claim. 
(h) Provide excess insurers and IHC such reports as they 
may reasonably require. 
(i) Provide information and assistance as may be required 
for preparation and filing of all reports required by 
State and Federal agencies in connection with IHC's 
approved self-insured status. This provision assumes 
IHC will report workers' compensation cases to SWS in 
compliance with state law. 
(j) File with appropriate governmental agencies such infor-
mation as is required on each claim. 
SWS will be responsible for handling all general and profes-
sional liability claims within the metropolitan zone (defined 
as Salt Lake and Weber Counties). IHC will be responsible 
for handling all liability claims outside the metropolitan 
zone, but may assign these claims to SWS as desired. Any 
such claims assigned to SWS will be charged at the rates out-
lined in paragraph four (4) of the Agreement. 
In consideration of the services to be performed by SWS here-
under, IHC shall pay to SWS a fee of sixty dollars ($60} per 
workers' compensation claim and three hundred fifty dollars 
($350) per liability claim. There will be a minimum annual 
fee of ninety-six thousand dollars ($96,000), to be paid in 
equal monthly payments. 
Billing for claims over and above the minimum annual fee will 
be submitted based upon the cumulative claim count as require 
by section 2(g) of the Agreement. 
Actual travel expenses for any general and professional lia-
bility claim requiring travel outside the metropolitan zone 
will be reimbursed to SWS. 
Attorneys' fees, court and/or hearing costs, costs of deposi-
tions, documents and exhibits, witness and expert fees, med-
ical and engineering appraisal, surveillance, photography 
and other incidental and special costs incurred to evaluate 
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All claims and related files generated by SWS as a result of 
its activity under this plan shall remain at all times the 
property of IHC with the exception of any supporting data 
required by SWS to make such accountings to IHC or excess 
insurers as are required in this Agreement. 
SWS is retained by IHC only for the purposes and to the 
extent set forth in this Agreement, and its relationship 
to IHC shall be that of an independent contractor. 
IHC agrees during the term of this Agreement and for a period 
of one (1) year following its termination it will not employ 
any person employed by SWS during the term of this Agreement 
without the written consent of SWS. 
IHC agrees to indemnify and to hold SWS harmless from and 
against any and all claims, actions, expense, losses, lia-
bilities, damages, penalties, costs, and demand whatsoever, 
together with counsel fees and expenses arising out of the 
business conducted by IHC and which are occasioned by IHC's 
failure to perform according to this Agreement. 
SWS agrees to indemnify and to hold IHC harmless from and 
against any and all claims, actions, expense, losses, lia-
bilities, damages, penalties, costs and demand whatsoever, 
together with counsel fees and expenses, arising out of 
activities of SWS and which are occasioned by the negligent 
or intentional acts, or omissions, of SWS. 
Any notice required or permitted to be given under this 
Agreement shall be sufficient if given in writing and sent 
by registered or certified mail to IHC or to SWS at the 
addresses first set forth above or to any other address of 
which written notice of change is given. 
The waiver by SWS or IHC of the breach of any provision- of 
this Agreement by the other party shall not operate or be 
construed as a waiver of any subsequent breach by either 
party or prevent either party thereafter enforcing any such 
provision. 
Upon termination of this Agreement SWS shall, at IHC's option, 
continue to supervise and report to IHC on all claims based 
on events which occurred during the terms of the Agreement 
prior to its termination, until such time as the disposition 
of such claims is completed. 
This Agreement sets forth all of the terms., conditions, and 
agreements of the parties relative to the subject matter 
hereof and supersedes any and all former agreements with 
respect thereto; and any and all such former agreements are 
hereby declared terminated and of no further force and effect 
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upon the execution and delivery hereof. There are no terms, 
conditions, or agreements with respect thereto, except as 
herein provided and no amendment or modification of this 
Agreement shall be effective unless reduced to writing and 
executed by the parties. 
15- Governing Law: The construction, interpretation, and per-
formance of this contract and all transactions under it 
shall be governed by the laws of the State of Utah. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Agreement as of the date first above written. 
ATTEST-:-
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC. 
Title 
SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC, 
ATTEST: 
LO/Vll e .Ytyi, By. c O* < ^ 2 - W c - ^ _ 
Title U Vice President 
E N 
Zhe Agreement effective January 1, 1S81 by and between 
Intermountain Health Care, Inc. (IHC) and Scott Wetzel Services, 
Inc. (SWS) to which this Amendment is attached is by this 
instrument modified as follows, effective July 1, 1982: 
1. "BrBgraph 2 (i). Delete the last sentence, which 
jez.cs, "This provision assumes IHC will report 
Workers1 Ccmcer.sation cases to SWS in compliance 
Substitute the following paragraph, "At IHC's 
option these Workers1 Compensation claims having 
a total compensable value under Cne Hundred Dollars 
($100) may be self-administered by IHC. Such self-
administered claims will be directly reported to 
the state authorities by IHC and not through SWS. 
IHC will be responsible for compliance with state, 
federal, and local law in the processing of self-
administered claims. All other Workers' Compensa-
tion claims will be reported to SWS for handling." 
2. Paragraph 2 (j). Delete the existing sentence. 
Substitute, "File with appropriate governmental 
agencies such information as required on each claim 
processed by SWS. 
3. Paragraph 4. The prior paragraph will remain in 
effect through June 30, 1982. For claims reported 
to SWS after June 30, 1982, IHC shall pay to"SWS a 
fee of Ninety Dollars ($90) per Workers1 Compensa-
tion claim and Three Hundred Fifty Dollars ($350) 
per Liability claim. There will be a minimum annual 
fee of Eighty Four Thousand Dollars ($34,000) to be 
paid in equal monthly installments, effective 
July 1, 1982. The combined minimum fee for 1982 is . 
Ninety thousand Dollars ($90,000). The first six 
months is Forty Eight Thousand Dollars ($48,000), 
the second six months Forty Two Thousand Dollars 
($42,000). The second and third paragraphs of 
Paragraph 4 remain in effect. 
It is further agreed that a value of Ten Thousand 
Dollars ($10,000) is to be placed upon past and 
future work done by IHC on pre-1981 Liability 
claims. This work was performed after December 31, 198 0 
by IHC. SWS will credit IHC Ten Thousand Dollars 
($10,000) for this work. 
roencrr .ent Pace 2 
4. Paragraph 13. Add the following, "This paragraph 
applies only to those claims reported to and 
processed by SWS under this Agreement." 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this 
Aareement. 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC, 
Date S i a n e d : 
Ckifr u, tftfx 
ATTEST 
rw
^«*^ > r J * + J** 
3y : 
~&a 
/ 
Sidney G. B r r e t t 
T i t l e : Vice President 
SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC, 
/ 
Date Signed: 
By: 
ATTEST: 
V 
Title: Executive Vice President 
A M E N D M E N T 
This agreement effective January 1, 1981 and subsequently amended through a 
transmittal letter, an amendment dated March 19, 1982 by and between Inter-
niountain Health Care, Inc., a Utah corporation (hereinafter referred to as 
IHC) with its principal place of business at 36 South State Street, Salt 
Lake City, Utah 84111, and Scott Wetzel Services Inc., a Washington corpor-
ation (hereinafter referred to as SWS), with its principal place of business 
at 500 Pacific Avenue, Bremerton, Washington 98310, herewith agree to the 
modification listed below, to be effective on a retroactive basis to 
January 1, 1983. 
Paragraph four originally called for a minimum annual fee of $96,000, to be 
paid in equal monthly payments. Through the aforementioned amendment, the 
nimimum annual fee to be reduced to $84,000, to be paid in equal monthly 
installments, effective July 1, 1982. Effective January 1, 1983, the minimum 
annual fee is reduced to $70,000, payable in equal monthly payments. It is 
agreed that appropriate adjustments in billings will reflect the new terms 
and conditions outlined in this amendment. 
ATTEST* 
t-sL Z 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC. 
By J?'*</\ 
Title i'.-c 
ATTEST: 
(i^ja 
SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, INC.* 
By ^uc-M,^ «A 
Title Executive Vice President 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ROGER ATKINSON; POLLY ATKINSON; 
and ROGER ATKINSON and POLLY 
ATKINSON, as guardians ad litem 
for CHAD ATKINSON, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
IHC HOSPITALS, INC., aka 
INTERMOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE 
HOSPITALS, INC., a Utah 
corporation; SCOTT WETZEL SERVICES, 
INC., a corporation; SCOTT OLSEN; 
STEPHEN G. MORGAN: MORGAN, SCALLEY 
& READING; and JOHN DOES I THROUGH 
X, 
Defendant. 
Civil No. C87-4908 
DEPOSITION UPON ORAL EXAMINATION OF 
PHILIP R. FISHLER 
TAKEN AT: 4001 So. 700 E, Salt Lake City, Utah 
DATE: March 30, 1988 
REPORTED BY: LYNN M. ROBINS, CSR 
From the Reporting Offices of: 
Capitol Reporters 
P. O. Box 1477, Salt Lake City, Utah 84110 
(801) 3 6 3 - 7 9 3 9 
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Q Do you recall anything else about the Chad 
Atkinson proceeding? 
A I recall that I questioned them. 
Q Questioned the parents? 
A Yes, sir. 
Q Do you recall what you asked? 
A I recall asking them if they had an attorney or 
words to that effect. I've read the transcript since and 
that would, of course, be much better than my memory but I 
know that I satisfied myself that they didn't have an 
attorney and didn't want to have an attorney and I satisfied 
myself that the settlement was not unreasonable and I 
therefore felt it was in the best interests of the child to 
approve the settlement and I approved it. 
Q Do you recall anything else about the 
proceeding? 
A No, which is one of maybe fifty to a hundred 
that I'd handled of that nature. 
Q Do you recall whether the Chad Atkinson 
proceeding was on your probate calendar that day? 
A It was not. 
Q How did it come to be assigned to you? 
A What date was it? 
Q I can represent to you that it was July 22nd, 
1 Qftl? 
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A It could be. I may not have been the probate 
judge. I suspect that Mr. Morgan came to me because I was a 
probate judge but I had probate from July of '82 through 
December '82. I must have picked probate up again in the 
last half of '83 but in any event as I recall the 22nd of 
July was a Friday, wasnft it? 
Q I don't know. 
A I think — as I recall it was a Friday but it 
was not on the usual probate calendar. From what I've 
reconstructed he just came to me and said Judge — I 
remember that part. He came to me and we were on a recess 
from another matter. The clerk rang me and back in chambers 
she said Mr. Morgan is here to see you. I said send him 
back. He came back and said do you have time to do a court 
approved settlement of a minor's claim and I said, yes, I'll 
do that for you and he left my chambers and he returned with 
these folks, the Atkinsons. 
Q Why are these approvals of — well, why do we 
have these kind of proceedings like the Chad Atkinson 
proceeding? What's the purpose of them? 
A f You're asking for my expert opinion? 
Q Yes. 
A The reason you have these proceedings is to 
protect the interests of the minor. There's more to it than 
just approving a settlement. The court will — first thing 
I 
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the court has to do is check to make sure that it is not 
Unreasonable. 
Q If the settlement isn't unreasonable? 
A Yes, and it's not for the judge, in my opinion, 
to .substitute his or her judgment for the judgment of the 
litigants. I know of a couple of cases in which the judge 
has done that, refused to approve the settlement, had the 
matter Igo to trial and then have the jury give the minor 
less tnan what the defense counsel was offering. 
1 So you can't interpose yourself too much. You 
have to say is this within the the realm of reasonableness. 
If it is you approve it, taking into account all the factors 
that if the settlement is rejected and the matter goes to 
trial tjhese folks could, A. get less, B. they could get 
nothinglor, C. they could get more or, D. they could get 
about wqat they could settle it for. 
The judge is never in a position to say 
substitute his judgment for the folks that are involved in 
litigation and the next part of it is that you make the 
parents or whoever has custody of the minor take the assets 
and hold them and keep them safe for that minor. You don't 
want these funds dissipated during the minority of the 
child. 
Q Previously I think you said that Steve Morgan 
came into your office; is that correct, the day of the 
1 Q What's your understanding of paragraph 2? 
2 A My understanding of paragraph 2 is that the 
3 settlement of all claims of Chad Atkinson against IHC were 
4 authorized and approved according to the terms set forth in 
5 the petition. 
6 Q Now this is a long question so be patient with 
7 me. Is it fair to say that you do not have a present 
8 recollection of what your understanding was at the time of 
9 the hearing with regard to approving whether Chad Atkinson 
10 or his parents could sue tort feasors other than IHC without 
11 IHC's approval? 
12 A I don't understand. You're asking me if I was 
13 of the mind then on the 22nd of July of '83 that the 
14 Atkinsons couldn't sue other tort feasors without IHC's 
15 approval? 
16 Q Right. 
17 A I don't have a present recollection on that 
18 particular point. 
19 Q And is there anything that would refresh your 
20 recollection that you can think of? 
21 A Yes, seeing the documents. 
22 Q What documents? 
23 A Well, the ones you have here. 
24 Q What would you need to read so that you could 
25 answer that question for me? 
1 A I think we've gone through it. 
2 Q If there's something in these documents that's 
3 going to help you tell me. 
4 A Paragraph 8 of the petition. 
5 Q Okay, do you now have a present recollection as 
6 to what your understanding was then? 
7 A Yes. 
8 Q And what was it? 
9 A The understanding was that it was as contained 
10 in paragraph 8 of the petition, giving of the words their 
11 usual and ordinary meaning. 
12 Q So your understanding was that they would be 
13 able to sue other tort feasors other than IHC? 
14 A They could sue other tort feasors but only up to 
15 an amount paid by petitioner for medical costs above the 
16 annuity of $20,000. 
17 Q Was your understanding at the hearing that the 
18 Atkinsons would need approval of IHC to do that? 
19 A I can't recall. 
20 Q Okay, let's take a look at Exhibit 1. Well, is 
21 there anything that would help you recall? 
22 A I don't know. 
23 Q Let's take a look at Exhibit 1. 
24 A That's my affidavit. 
25 Q That's your affidavit, off of your affidavit 
1 transcript of Exhibit 1, line 22. You asked Mr. Morgan are 
2 you going to help these folks with the bond. Why did you 
3 ask that question? 
4 A Because I wouldn't approve the settlement unless 
5 I they had a bond. 
Q Why did you ask Mr. Morgan to help them? 
A Because Mr. Morgan had prepared all the 
8 I aocuments and one of the documents that he prepared was not 
9 in order. 
10 Q And what document was that? 
11 A The order. I wouldn't sign the order. 
12 Q Without a bond? 
13 A Well, yes, and you asked me before if I had read 
14 Exhibit 3. This transcript tells you that I did. I read 
15 the original order and I wouldn't approve it because I 
16 wanted to make sure that they had a bond in place. 
17 Q How long have you been an attorney? 
18 A I don't know how you want to define that. 
19 Q How long have you been a member of the Utah 
20 State Bar? 
21 A Since September 30th, 1969. 
22 Q And during that have you ever — well, it's an 
23 awkward question but have you ever had any proceedings 
24 similar to what Steve Morgan had with Chad Atkinson. Did 
25 ycu ever represent a health care provider or insurance 
provider, an insurance company where you were seeking to 
have a minor settlement approved? 
A Yes. 
Q About how many times have you done that? 
A As a lawyer? 
Q Yes. 
A I know I'm not supposed to guess but I would 
speculate probably fifteen times. 
Q And during any of those fifteen times have the 
parents ever asked you what they thought the settlement was 
fair? 
Yes, 
Q And what did — do you recall what your 
responses have been? 
A Yes. 
Q What were they? 
A I am not your attorney. Don't ask me. I'm 
representing people who are adverse to your interests. I 
cannot pass on this settlement. I will, not render an 
opinion^ 
And have you also advised them to seek another 
attorney for his opinion? 
Q So it's always stopped that I can't render an 
opinion because I represent somebody else? 
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A That's right. 
Q You've never told them they could go see another 
lawyer to get his opinion? 
A As a lawyer? 
Q Yes. 
A As a lawyer I never told them to go seek the 
advice of another attorney, no. 
Q Have you ever told them in effect that the court 
won't approve a settlement unless they find it's fair? 
A I don't recall. I haven't done as a lawyer, Mr. 
Gardiner, to give you some background on this and I know I 
12 shouldn't be volunteering but generally these are the types 
of things you do as a younger lawyer in a firm and after 
you've practiced law for ten years or fifteen years you're 
not really doing these kinds of things. I have not handled 
as a lawyer a court-approved settlement or minor's claim I'm 
sure in eight to ten years so thinking back to what happened 
in the 1970 's, it's difficult but I think — I cannot deny 
that I might have said something like that to them but I 
can't sit here and tell you that I did in a specific case. 
Q Let's put your judicial hat back on. 
A All right. 
Q I think previously you told me that when you 
look at these minor settlements and determine whether to 
approve them or not the criteria isn't whether the agreement 
unreasonable. 
Q But it was the inherent risks of going to court, 
going further with this matter and perhaps getting nothing 
combined with the fact that this settlement would pay Chad 
money over his lifetime plus give him free medical care, 
that was the basis of your decision that the settlement was 
not unreasonable and, in other words, the settlement — your 
decision that it was not unreasonable really didn't have 
) I anything to do with whether or not Chad or his parents could 
) I go on and sue anybody else. It was what they were getting 
from IHC that was the basis plus balanced against the 
inherent risk of ligation? 
3 I A You're talking about two things. You're talking 
4 I about the bird which is the nine hundred thousand, the 
medical care, that's the bird, and also the fact that it's 
in hand and it was those factors that made me conclude that 
this was in the best interests of that child. 
8 J Q That's all. 
.9 I FURTHER EXAMINATION 
BY MR. GARDINER 
Jl I Q In the Atkinson case you didn't evaluate the 
12 underlying claim against IHC did you? 
23 A No, I didn't. 
24 Q So when you talk about these inherent risks 
25 you're talking about the inherent risks that are common in 
